



Background Document

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Fragility of Low Voltage Switchgear

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Background Documentation

FEMA P-58 Background Documents are a series of reports documenting the technical background and source information for key aspects of the FEMA P-58 methodology and its implementation. These reports were developed over the course of the 10-year ATC-58/ATC-58-1 Projects funded under FEMA Contracts EMW-2001-RP-0056 and HSFEHQ-06-D-1105.

Background Documents were developed by consultants, serving at various levels within the project hierarchy, reporting the results of: (1) decisions on technical development protocols; (2) focused studies on the development of key aspects of the methodology; (3) documentation of recommended procedures; and (4) collection of available data for the development of structural and nonstructural fragilities. They were initially intended to serve as a record of the technical state-of-knowledge at the time they were produced, and as resources for the development of the eventual project reports. As such, they represent a snapshot in time, and may, or may not, match the technical content, recommended procedures, or data incorporated into the final methodology and its implementation.

This Background Document is intended for the purpose of providing supplemental knowledge to users of the FEMA P-58 methodology. Information contained herein has not been independently verified for accuracy as a stand-alone document, and may have been superseded in its final implementation within the methodology. Specifically in the case of certain nonstructural component fragilities, the NISTIR fragility classification numbering scheme was modified over the course of the project, and the fragility classification number assigned in this document might be different from numbers assigned in the final fragility database. Users of information in this document assume all liability arising from such use.

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Fragility of low voltage switchgear

Keith Porter (10/05/2009)

Table 1. Summary results

Fragility, damage measures, and consequences for	
Component category:	D5012.020, low voltage switchgear, avg. or unknown conditions D5012.021, low voltage switchgear, well anchored, strong load path to floor, cabinets within ½ inch are bolted together, no large items that could fall on switchgear D5012.022, low voltage switchgear, 1 deficiency (typ. no anchorage) D5012.023, low voltage switchgear, 2+ deficiencies (e.g., no anchorage + interaction concerns)
Basic composition:	Electrical cabinet. See Figure 1.
Units:	ea
Number of damage states:	1
If multiple damage states:	simultaneous
Author and date:	Keith Porter 05 Oct 2009
Damage states, fragilities, and consequences for D5012.020, average or unknown conditions. For other conditions see Table 7.	
	DS1
Description:	Inoperative
Illustration:	Not available
Demand parameter	Peak floor acceleration (geometric mean, g)
Median demand (θ) ⁽¹⁾ :	1.2g
Data dispersion (β_d) ⁽²⁾	0.6
Uncertainty (β_u) ⁽²⁾	
Total dispersion (β) ⁽¹⁾ :	0.6
Probability ⁽¹⁾ :	
Correlation:	
Repairs required:	Replace burnt-out circuit breakers (50% of cases) or replace insulators (50% of cases)
Possible consequences:	
Repair cost (Y/N/?):	Y
Death or injury (Y/N/?):	N
Inoperative facility (Y/N/?):	Y
Red tagging (Y/N/?):	N
Comments ⁽²⁾ :	

(1) If ordered damage states, leave “probability” blank. If mutually exclusive or simultaneous damage states, provide parameters in DS1 column only, and probabilities of each damage state in “probability.” Round θ to 2 significant figures and β to nearest 0.05.

(2) For methods A and B only, provide β_d and β_u and explain in the “comments” row any β_u value that differs from recommendations in Appendix C.

Table 2. Summary supporting information template

Literature summary See Porter et al., ND. Fragility of mechanical, electrical, and plumbing equipment. EPRI (1991) offers data on 4 specimens and proposes a GERS ZPA = 1.0g for LVS without frame reinforcement, 1.5g with base frame reinforcement. 1 specimen had a breaker trip, but this failure is ignored.	
Number of specimens tested:	149 from data set 1 (EPRI + EQE data) 43 with known PMFs from data set 2 (EPRI) 4 from GERSs tests (EPRI 1991)
Construction quality:	<input type="checkbox"/> exceeds <input type="checkbox"/> meets <input type="checkbox"/> does not meet requirements of: <u>all available data are for well anchored motor generators</u>
Seismic installation conditions:	varies
Loading protocols applied:	19 earthquakes
Method for observing demand:	Nearby strong-motion instruments
Method for observing damage:	First-hand observations by EQE International (e.g., DL McCormick, Nancy Horstman, Sam Swan, Peter Yanev, etc.) and by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), e.g., Bob Kassawara. The investigators also examined facility engineers' records or interviewed them. Observations made during post-earthquake facility surveys on behalf of EPRI, with the intention of documenting failures <i>and</i> non-failures, with installation conditions, etc.

Table 3. Failure data for all low voltage switchgear (data set 1: EQE + EPRI data set)

r, g	Units, M	Failed, m	$w = M/\Sigma M$	$y = m/M$	Φ
0.20	17	0	0.114	0.000	0.002
0.23	6	0	0.040	0.000	0.004
0.24	5	0	0.034	0.000	0.005
0.25	38	3	0.255	0.079	0.005
0.26	6	0	0.040	0.000	0.007
0.30	26	0	0.174	0.000	0.013
0.35	6	0	0.040	0.000	0.024
0.37	2	0	0.013	0.000	0.029
0.40	20	1	0.134	0.050	0.039
0.42	9	1	0.060	0.111	0.047
0.47	1	0	0.007	0.000	0.068
0.50	5	0	0.034	0.000	0.083
0.56	3	1	0.020	0.333	0.110
0.57	3	0	0.020	0.000	0.115
0.65	2	0	0.013	0.000	0.164
Sum	149	6			

Table 4. Failure data for low voltage switchgear with 0 installation deficiencies (EPRI data set)

r, g	Units, M	Failed, m	Comment
0.30	5	0	EPRI (2007) UNO
0.40	2	0	
0.35	1	0	
0.26	4	0	
0.42	4	0	
0.25	1	1	Cracked fiberglass supporting vertical bus bars in the switchgear assembly
0.25	1	0	
0.30	1	0	
0.20	4	0	
0.20	4	0	
0.25	4	0	
0.25	1	0	
0.51	2	0	
1.0	1	0	EPRI (1991)
1.9	1	0	Ditto
2.9	1	0	Ditto
3.4	1	0	Ditto, breaker trip ignored here
Sum	38	1	

Table 5. Failure data for low voltage switchgear with 1 installation deficiency (typ. unanchored, EPRI data set)

r, g	Units, M	Failed, m
0.30	3	0
0.35	1	0
0.40	5	0
Sum	9	0

Table 6. Quality tests

Quality test	DS1	DS2	DS3
Passes Lilliefors goodness of fit test? (Type A only)	NA		
Are θ and β within 20% of past results? If not discuss.	θ : ~Y, β : Y		
Are $0.2 \leq \beta \leq 0.6$? If not discuss.	Y		
Do you believe demand with 10% failure probability?	Y		
Discussion. Prior vulnerability functions are from Johnson et al. (1999), whose θ s vary from 0.9 to 1.4; compare with 0.9 to 2.0 here. Re believing 10% failure probability, curve goes through data cloud.			

Table 7. Extrapolation to other detailed conditions and to average conditions

Condition (describe)	From tests?	DS1		J99	
		θ	β	θ	β
Best: anchored; good load path; no pounding concerns; no interaction concerns. Method C used after adding GERS data.	Y	4.6	0.4		
Moderate: one deficiency, typ. unanchored	Y	1.0	0.4		
Worst: 2 or more deficiencies, e.g., unanchored and pounding concerns	N	0.9	0.5		
Average or unknown	Y	1.2	0.6		
<p><i>Do not use fragility functions for $PFA > 1.5$ times maximum value in the observations.</i></p> <p>Basis for extrapolation. For moderate, average, and best conditions, from data shown above. For worst conditions, borrow worst conditions from Johnson et al. (1999).</p> <p>What factors affect θ and β? Those listed under “best” conditions.</p>					

“From tests” means that the tests reported here are believed to represent this condition level



Figure 1. Low voltage switchgear




Figure 2. Low voltage switchgear fragility (a) well anchored, strong load path to floor, cabinets within ½ inch are bolted together, no large items that could fall on switchgear, (b) average of unknown conditions, (c) 1 deficiency, typ. unanchored

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